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ADVICE AND COMPLICITY 
MATTHEW A. SMITH† 
ABSTRACT 
  The practice of law occurs at the boundary between the criminal 
law and the rules of professional responsibility. In their respective 
definitions of lawyers’ complicity in their clients’ crimes, these two 
systems of rules conflict. The rules of professional responsibility 
exonerate a lawyer for advising a client in committing a crime if the 
lawyer acted in good faith; however, the criminal law convicts the 
same lawyer of aiding and abetting the client’s crime even if the 
lawyer believed that the conduct in question was legal. As a result of 
this conflict, choosing which standard of complicity to apply in a 
given case risks undermining the purposes and interests served by the 
system of rules whose standard is not chosen. Perhaps worse, the lack 
of a consistent standard of complicity for lawyers acting as advisors 
forecloses all opportunities to reach a common understanding of 
when lawyers will be held liable for advising on legally dubious 
conduct. The legal profession’s ethical crises over lawyers’ roles in the 
“torture memo” controversy, the Enron scandal, and the Kaye 
Scholer affair demonstrate the confusion that has ensued from the 
absence of an adequate concept of complicity. This Note uses these 
crises to examine the conflict between the concepts of complicity 
embodied in the professional rules and the criminal law. It then seeks 
to resolve this conflict by exploring whether a coherent concept of 
lawyers’ complicity can preserve the principles and purposes served 
by both systems while differentiating the innocent advisor from the 
culpable accomplice. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The theory of complicity describes the circumstances in which 
“one person . . . becomes liable for the crime of another.”1 The basic 
doctrine consists of two elements: first, the alleged accomplice must 
take an action that facilitates the primary actor’s pursuit of a 
potentially criminal goal;2 second, the accomplice must act with the 
purpose of enabling the primary actor to achieve the goal.3 If the goal 
pursued by the primary actor is a crime, and the primary actor 
accomplishes it,4 then the person facilitating the conduct in question 
becomes an accomplice.5 Unless a mistake of law6 would be a viable 
defense to the primary actor’s crime, the accomplice’s belief that the 
goal pursued by the primary actor is legal does not mitigate the 
accomplice’s culpability.7 
Lawyers are professional facilitators. They engage routinely in 
helping people accomplish their purposes. As advisors, lawyers are 
called upon to render candid opinions on how clients may pursue 
their goals within the boundaries of the law.8 According to the rules of 
 
 1. Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause, and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of 
Doctrine, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 336 (1985). 
 2. See id. at 342 (“Two kinds of actions render the secondary party liable for the criminal 
actions of the primary party: intentionally influencing the decision of the primary party to 
commit a crime, and intentionally helping the primary actor commit the crime . . . .”). 
 3. See id. at 346 (“[The accomplice] must act with the intention of influencing or assisting 
the primary actor to engage in the conduct constituting the crime.”); see also WAYNE R. 
LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 576 (2d ed. 1986) (“[Accomplice liability 
consists of giving] assistance . . . with the intent thereby to promote or facilitate commission of 
the crime.”). 
 4. See Kadish, supra note 1, at 355 (“By its nature, the doctrine of complicity, like 
causation, requires a result. It is not a doctrine of inchoate liability.”). 
 5. See id. at 337 (“[The accomplice’s] liability is derivative, which is to say, it is incurred by 
virtue of a violation of law by the primary party to which the secondary party contributed.”). 
 6. “Mistake of law” refers to a defendant’s erroneous belief that the conduct for which the 
defendant is being prosecuted is not criminal. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 3, at 412–13 
(outlining the doctrine of mistake of law). A mistake of law is not a defense to most crimes. Id. 
 7. See Kadish, supra note 1, at 349 (“[T]o be liable as an accomplice in the crime 
committed by the principal, the secondary party must act with the mens rea required by the 
definition of the principal’s crime.”); see also LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 3, at 579 
(“Generally, it may be said that accomplice liability exists when . . . [the accomplice’s] purpose is 
to encourage or assist another in the commission of a crime as to which the accomplice has the 
requisite mental state.”). 
 8. See 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING 
§ 22.2 (3d ed. 2009) (“[L]awyers contribute to the peaceful running of a lawful society by 
advising their clients what the law is, and by carrying out their client’s wishes within the bounds 
of law.”). 
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professional responsibility governing the legal profession, a lawyer 
may not advise a client in regard to activity that the lawyer knows to 
be criminal.9 But the rules do not penalize a lawyer who advises a 
client in an effort to determine the legality of the client’s intended 
purposes if the lawyer acts in good faith.10 
This Note argues that the criminal law and the professional rules 
embody conflicting concepts of lawyers’ complicity in their clients’ 
criminal activity. Under the criminal law’s doctrine of complicity, a 
lawyer who gives advice to a client to facilitate the client’s purpose, 
with knowledge of what the client intends to do, becomes an 
accomplice if the client’s conduct is later determined to be criminal.11 
The lawyer’s reasoned belief that the client’s purpose was not 
criminal does not exonerate the lawyer unless that belief would also 
excuse the client.12 In practice, this occurs rarely, because a mistake of 
law is not a defense to most crimes.13 By contrast, under the 
professional rules, the lawyer’s belief as to the legality of the client’s 
conduct may determine whether the lawyer committed professional 
misconduct.14 Under the professional rules, a good-faith belief that 
the client’s purpose was legal is exculpatory. Under the criminal law, 
that belief excuses nothing. 
As a result of this conflict, the professional rules acquit when the 
criminal law convicts. This conflict is not of merely theoretical 
relevance. Although the criminal law and the professional rules are 
separate systems, both seek to govern the behavior of lawyers acting 
 
 9. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2009) (“A lawyer shall not counsel 
a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or 
fraudulent . . . .”); see also HAZARD & HODES, supra note 8, § 5.3 (“Rule 1.2 seeks to assure that 
lawyers not become accomplices in criminal or fraudulent conduct.”). According to the ABA, 
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct have been adopted in some form by all but one state. 
See Am. Bar Ass’n, Model Rules of Professional Conduct Dates of Adoption, AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/alpha_states.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2010).  
 10. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (“[A] lawyer . . . may counsel or 
assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or 
application of the law.”); see also id. R. 8.4 cmt. 4 (“A lawyer may refuse to comply with an 
obligation imposed by law upon a good faith belief that no valid obligation exists.”). 
 11. See Kadish, supra note 1, at 346 (“[I]f it was the purpose of the one giving the advice to 
influence the other to commit the crime, he is an accomplice . . . .”). 
 12. See id. at 349 (describing the mens rea of accomplice liability). 
 13. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 3, at 412–13 (noting that mistake of law is “ordinarily 
not a recognized defense”). 
 14. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (permitting lawyers to assist clients 
in a good-faith effort to determine the “scope, meaning or application” of the law); see also id. 
R. 8.4 cmt. 4 (“A lawyer may refuse to comply with an obligation imposed by law upon a good 
faith belief that no valid obligation exists.”). 
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as advisors. Lawyers may adhere to the stricter notion of complicity 
embodied in the criminal law and risk unnecessarily limiting the 
circumstances in which they may give advice. In the alternative, they 
may adhere to the more permissive good-faith standard of the 
professional norms, at the risk of being prosecuted as accomplices 
without the benefit of a good-faith defense. 
This inconsistency between the criminal law and the professional 
rules also undermines public expectations of lawyers’ behavior. If the 
criminal-law standard of complicity prevails, the public gains the 
assurance of holding lawyers accountable for their complicit actions 
according to the same legal standards that apply to the general public. 
At the same time, the criminal standard risks deterring lawyers from 
giving socially constructive advice out of fear of being prosecuted 
should it turn out that, contrary to the lawyer’s legal opinion, the 
client’s conduct is actually criminal. But if the professional rules’ 
concept of complicity governs, the public must accept that lawyers 
possess a special immunity to prosecution for actions taken as 
accomplices if those actions are taken in good faith. The legal 
community would bear the burden of justifying such a self-interested 
exception. 
This Note begins by considering contexts in which the criminal 
law’s doctrine of complicity has been applied to lawyers acting as 
advisors. In particular, Part I examines how the criminal law 
governing lawyers’ advice in the context of fraud prosecutions 
effectively accommodates the professional rules’ exemption for 
advice given in good faith. The fraud example provides a model for 
reconciling the disparity between the criminal law’s and the 
professional rules’ basic doctrines of complicity. Part II discusses the 
perceptions of lawyers’ complicity that appeared during three major 
crises in the legal profession. The standard of complicity that emerged 
from these crises uses a distinction between the lawyer’s separate 
roles as advisor and as advocate to draw the line between complicity 
and appropriate legal advice. Unlike the law of fraud, the emerging 
standard does not possess clear mens rea requirements that prevent 
conflict with the professional rules’ protection for the lawyer who acts 
in good faith. 
Part III explains why consistency between the models of 
complicity found in the professional rules and criminal laws is 
necessary to avoid undermining the values served by either system. In 
light of this discussion, Part IV considers how the distinction between 
advising and advocacy could be implemented as a general standard 
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for lawyers’ complicity outside the context of existing specialized 
rules, such as fraud. It examines how the professional rules’ excuse 
for advice given in good faith could be applied to eliminate the 
conflict between the professional rules’ and the criminal law’s 
differing conceptions of complicity. 
I.  TWO CATEGORIES OF CRIMINAL COMPLICITY 
Prosecutions of lawyers who advise clients on criminal activity 
can be classified in two broad categories that correspond to the 
complexity of the client’s underlying crime. In one category, the 
client’s criminality is relatively clear: the client commits perjury, 
willfully disobeys a court order, or lies to immigration officials, and 
the client does so with the lawyer’s encouragement or approval. The 
crimes themselves are simple, and no legal expertise is necessary to 
understand that the act in question is illegal. Due to the obvious 
illegality of the act, prosecuting the lawyer for advising the client to 
commit that act is uncontroversial under both the criminal law and 
the professional rules.15 
In the second category, the client’s offense is more complex, and 
the lawyer may be prosecuted for aiding an act whose criminality 
depends on a more difficult question of legal judgment. In these 
cases, there is a greater risk of conflict between the professional rules’ 
and the criminal law’s respective concepts of complicity. Due to the 
nuanced legal questions that appear in complex cases, lawyers are 
more able to argue that, according to their reasoned interpretation of 
the law, they believed that the client’s conduct was legal. When the 
determination of guilt or innocence turns on the integrity of the 
lawyer’s legal judgment, it is easier to cast that lawyer’s decision as 
having been made in good faith. 
The crime of aiding and abetting fraud offers an example of this 
dynamic.16 The criminal laws proscribing fraud contain specific mens 
rea requirements that augment the basic doctrine of complicity and 
avoid the conflict that would otherwise emerge with the professional 
 
 15. See ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) annot. (6th ed. 2007) 
(citing lawyer discipline cases involving violations of court orders and other clearly illegal 
offenses). 
 16. See Peter J. Henning, Targeting Legal Advice, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 669, 688 (2005) 
(discussing legal advisors’ susceptibility to allegations of fraud). See generally Geoffrey C. 
Hazard, Jr., How Far May a Lawyer Go in Assisting a Client in Legally Wrongful Conduct?, 35 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 669 (1981) (discussing the scope of attorneys’ liability for client fraud). 
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rules’ standard of good faith. For example, the criminal provisions of 
the Securities Act of 193317 and the Securities Exchange Act of 193418 
make it a criminal offense to willfully or knowingly violate their 
substantive provisions.19 A lawyer who knowingly violates any of the 
securities laws can hardly be imagined to have acted in good faith. 
Although stopping short of offering a broad good-faith defense 
against a fraud prosecution,20 these mens rea elements require that 
the defendant possessed a mental state that is incompatible with good 
faith.  
United States v. Benjamin21 illustrates how securities fraud 
statutes eliminate the conflict between the models of complicity in the 
 
 17. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2006); see also id. § 77x (providing 
criminal penalties for “[a]ny person who willfully violates any of the provisions of this 
subchapter”). 
 18. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78oo (2006 & Supp. III 2009); see 
also id. § 78ff(a) (providing criminal penalties for “any person who willfully and knowingly” 
misrepresents a material fact in an Exchange Act statement). 
 19. LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1347 
(4th ed. 2001) (“All of the SEC statutes make it a criminal offense ‘willfully’ to violate any of 
their provisions, any related rule, or (with respect to the last four acts in the series) any related 
order.”). In SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978), the court 
upheld aiding-and-abetting liability for lawyers advising on securities transactions, holding 
counsel liable for ignoring the materiality of information that was omitted from a shareholder 
proxy statement and for subsequently failing to interfere with a related merger. See id. at 713 
(“The record amply demonstrates the ‘knowledge of the fraud, and not merely the  
undisclosed material facts’ that is required to meet this element of secondary liability.” (quoting 
Hirsch v. du Pont, 553 F.2d 750, 759 (2d Cir. 1977))). The Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.), instructed the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to 
prosecute violations of the Exchange Act, codifying a broad range of criminal prohibitions that 
apply to counsel advising on a securities transaction. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (providing for 
prosecution of persons who “knowingly provide substantial assistance” to violators of the 
securities laws); Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 769 (2008) 
(recognizing that “Congress . . . directed prosecution of aiders and abettors by the SEC” in 
§ 78t(e)). The precedent established in Stoneridge continues to haunt lawyers advising on 
disclosure-related matters involving securities. See SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 
507, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (questioning why the SEC did not seek penalties from lawyers who 
prepared disclosure statements omitting allegedly material information in a merger transaction). 
Courts have interpreted the relevant section of the PSLRA as requiring that an aider and 
abettor have actual knowledge of a violation of the Exchange Act rather than allowing liability 
for recklessness by secondary actors. See, e.g., SEC v. Pasternak, 561 F. Supp. 2d 459, 501 
(D.N.J. 2008) (requiring actual knowledge of a securities-law violation, as opposed to reckless 
action, and citing cases that imposed the same requirement). 
 20. See United States v. Wolfson, 405 F.2d 779, 781–82 (2d Cir. 1968) (rejecting appellants’ 
argument that they could not be convicted of violating the Securities Exchange Act because 
they were not aware of its registration requirements). 
 21. United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1964). 
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criminal law and the professional rules.22 Martin Benjamin, a lawyer, 
was convicted of willfully conspiring to sell unregistered securities in 
concert with Milton Mende, Benjamin’s client and the principal 
promoter of the scheme.23 Benjamin and his co-conspirators obtained 
corporate assets that were sold in 1919, prior to the enactment of the 
Securities Act of 1933.24 Section 3(a)(1) of the Securities Act 
contained an exemption from its registration requirements for shares 
of companies that were sold prior to or within sixty days of May 27, 
1933, provided that those shares were not sold again by a new issuer.25 
Mende sought to take advantage of the exemption for shares issued 
prior to 1933 by purchasing all of the corporation’s outstanding shares 
and selling them under the name of a new corporation.26 Benjamin 
supported Mende’s efforts by drafting letters to potential purchasers 
asserting that the shares fell within the exemption and therefore were 
not subject to the registration requirement.27 
Arguably, Benjamin may not have understood that Mende’s 
acquisition of the pre-1933 shares made the subsequent sale of those 
shares a new issuance that was not subject to the exemption in 
Section 3(a)(1). Provided that Benjamin was laboring under a 
mistaken belief about the applicability of the exemption, he may be 
said to have been acting in good faith. But the “willfulness” criterion 
of the Securities Act fraud provision foreclosed this argument by 
requiring evidence that Benjamin actually knew of the registration 
requirements and also knew that Mende’s actions rendered Section 
3(a)(1) inapplicable to the new share offering.28 Evidence was found 
to support both requirements, leaving Benjamin little room to argue 
that he acted in good faith.  
 
 22. Cf. Manning Gilbert Warren III, The Primary Liability of Securities Lawyers, 50 SMU 
L. REV. 383, 398 (1996) (invoking Benjamin as a “behavior-shaping judicial statement[]”). See 
generally LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 19, at 176 (noting that the SEC frequently quotes from 
Benjamin in enforcement actions); Marc I. Steinberg, Attorney Liability for Client Fraud, 1991 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 1 (quoting Judge Friendly’s opinion in Benjamin). 
 23. Benjamin, 328 F.2d at 856. 
 24. Id. at 857. 
 25. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(1) (1964). 
 26. Benjamin, 328 F.2d at 857. 
 27. See id. at 857–60 (describing Benjamin’s activities). 
 28. See id. at 863 (“[Benjamin] must have known that control of the corporation . . . was 
being acquired by Mende and that the statute explicitly denied exemption to any new offerings 
by persons in control, a limitation of which his testimony before the SEC showed he was well 
aware.”). 
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A second case, United States v. Cavin,29 demonstrates how 
criminal fraud statutes avoid the potential for disagreement between 
the criminal law’s and the professional rules’ basic doctrines of 
complicity. In Cavin, the trial court held an associate at a New 
Orleans law firm liable as a co-conspirator in a scheme to defraud the 
state insurance regulator.30 The associate, Gerald Daigle, Jr., advised 
David Ridgeway in Ridgeway’s efforts to start an insurance business.31 
Daigle reviewed documentation submitted to the Louisiana insurance 
regulators and advised Ridgeway on compliance with the regulators’ 
requirement that the insurance company maintain a sufficient capital 
balance to pay out claims by policyholders. He also actively assisted 
Ridgeway in obtaining funds for the insurance venture.32 
Contrary to the statements that Daigle submitted to the 
insurance regulators, the assets were not owned by Ridgeway but 
were borrowed.33 Although Daigle had been involved in orchestrating 
several of the loan transactions,34 he insisted at trial that he could not 
have acted with fraudulent intent because he did not understand that 
the assets were disqualified from fulfilling the regulator’s capital-
balance requirement.35 But the court found sufficient evidence that 
Daigle knew the assets were disqualified and that he acted with the 
purpose to defraud the insurance regulator.36 This proof of Daigle’s 
knowledge established his guilt because it excluded the possibility 
that he had acted in good faith. 
Cavin and Benjamin illustrate that fraud statutes reconcile the 
criminal law’s and the professional rules’ versions of complicity by 
adding mens rea elements that require some degree of knowledge 
that the act in question is illegal. By imposing this requirement, the 
fraud statutes guide judicial analysis to a result that excludes the 
possibility that a guilty defendant acted in good faith. The anti-fraud 
 
 29. United States v. Cavin, 39 F.3d 1299 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 30. Id. at 1304. 
 31. Id. at 1302 (“Ridgeway’s efforts were assisted professionally by Daigle, an associate 
soon to become a partner at a prestigious New Orleans law firm.”). 
 32. See id. at 1302–04 (describing Daigle’s activities). 
 33. Id. at 1303 (“To replace the $1 million . . . Ridgeway entered into a stock rental 
transaction. . . . [Ridgeway] reported [the stock] to the Commissioner as an unencumbered 
asset.”). 
 34. Id. at 1303–04 (describing Daigle’s involvement in a sham stock-rental transaction and 
securities purchase). 
 35. Id. at 1306 (“Daigle maintains that the status of these so-called ‘rental assets’ was 
unclear at the time and therefore he lacked fraudulent intent . . . .”). 
 36. See id. at 1306–07 (outlining evidence suggesting Daigle’s knowledge and purpose). 
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rules offer an example of how the criminal law can accommodate the 
professional rules’ protection for advice given in good faith. 
II.  THE ADVISING-ADVOCACY DISTINCTION AS A  
MEASUREMENT OF COMPLICITY 
The requirement of fraudulent intent that preserves fraud 
prosecutions’ consistency with the professional rules’ good-faith 
standard does not exist in all conceptions of lawyers’ complicity. The 
critical responses to three crises in the legal profession invoked a 
different norm for lawyers’ complicity that casts the advising lawyer 
as an accomplice when the lawyer has confused the responsibilities of 
an advisor with the role of an advocate before the court. While these 
criticisms present a viable concept of lawyers’ complicity, unlike the 
criminal prohibitions on fraud, this concept of complicity lacks 
specific mens rea requirements that reconcile the criminal law’s 
doctrine of complicity with the professional rules’ exemption for 
lawyers acting in good faith. 
Neutrality figures prominently in the duties of the advisor, 
whereas the adversarial process found in litigation relies upon zealous 
partisanship.37 But the systemic protections afforded by the 
adversarial process disappear in the context of the lawyer’s advising 
role, since no opposing counsel or neutral arbiter acts as a check on 
partisan representation.38 In the advising context, the lawyer is 
expected to present the client with the potential risks involved in 
adopting a given course of action.39 Bias in favor of the client’s 
 
 37. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2009) (“In advising a client, a lawyer 
shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice.”); HAZARD & 
HODES, supra note 8, § 23.2 (noting that Rule 2.1 prohibits the lawyer from “play[ing] 
sycophant” to a client seeking to “have her own preconceptions confirmed rather than seek 
genuine advice”); see also DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING 
THE LEGAL PROFESSION 53–58 (2000) (presenting and critiquing the traditional justifications 
for the adversary system); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 564 (1986) 
(summarizing the features of the adversary system). 
 38. See Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint 
Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1161 (1958) (“Partisan advocacy plays its essential part in 
[litigation], and the lawyer pleading his client’s case may properly present it in the most 
favorable light. A similar resolution of doubts in one direction becomes inappropriate when the 
lawyer acts as counselor.”). 
 39. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4(b) (“A lawyer shall explain a matter to 
the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the 
representation.”); HAZARD & HODES, supra note 8, § 7.4 (“[Under Rule 1.4(b),] a lawyer must 
arm clients with the information necessary for making important decisions about the 
representation . . . .”). 
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preferred course of action would undermine the integrity of the 
lawyer’s advice.40 
 The controversies surrounding the “torture memos” issued by 
the Office of Legal Counsel; Vinson & Elkins’ role in the Enron 
scandal; and Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler’s (Kaye 
Scholer) representation of Lincoln Savings & Loan (Lincoln) in an 
examination by a federal bank regulator involve lawyers who were 
subsequently criticized for having been complicit in illegal conduct. 
This Part isolates the common elements of each of these criticisms to 
delineate the concept of complicity that emerged in each case. This 
Part concludes that, according to these critics’ concepts of complicity, 
the distinction between advising and advocacy constitutes an 
important element in determining when a lawyer ceases to act as an 
advisor and becomes an accomplice. 
A.  The Torture Memo Controversy 
In a series of memoranda written in 2002 and 2003, attorneys in 
the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) created 
the framework for the Department of Defense and Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) interrogations of prisoners held in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.41 Although then–Assistant 
Attorney General Jay Bybee signed all but one of the memos, they 
were drafted primarily by John Yoo,42 an influential member of the 
OLC who espoused expansive views of presidential power in 
wartime.43 Together, the opinions authored by Yoo eliminated the 
legal restraints upon the treatment of individuals held by the CIA and 
the Department of Defense imposed by the Geneva Conventions,44 
 
 40. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 8, § 23.2 (“A lawyer’s duty to exercise independent 
professional judgment may be threatened not only by ‘others’ but by clients as well; a client may 
consult a lawyer to have her own preconceptions confirmed rather than to seek genuine 
advice.”). 
 41. See generally THE TORTURE PAPERS 3–360 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dreitel 
eds., 2005) (containing memoranda composed by OLC attorneys). 
 42. See S. COMM. ON ARMED SERVS., 110TH CONG., INQUIRY INTO THE TREATMENT OF 
DETAINEES IN U.S. CUSTODY, at xv–xvi (Comm. Print 2008) (describing the drafting of the 
memos). 
 43. See JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE 
BUSH ADMINISTRATION 22–23 (2007) (introducing Yoo as an “OLC deputy with authority to 
issue legal opinions that were binding throughout the executive branch”). 
 44. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., OLC, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and William J. Haynes, II, Gen. Counsel, U.S. 
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the Torture Convention,45 customary international law,46 the Fifth and 
Eighth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution,47 U.S. federal law of 
general applicability,48 U.S. federal law applicable only in special 
federal jurisdictions,49 and the U.S. Torture Statute50 and War Crimes 
Statute.51 In place of these restraints, the memos left a construction of 
the Torture Statute that prohibited only the most extreme forms of 
treatment,52 which could be avoided by interrogators who asserted 
that they acted out of “self-defense” or “necessity”53 and that, in any 
event, would be unconstitutional as applied to interrogations ordered 
by the president.54 According to the report of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee on the treatment of prisoners held by the CIA 
and the Department of Defense, the memos “distorted the meaning 
and intent of the anti-torture laws” and “rationalized the abuse of 
detainees in U.S. custody.”55 This deconstruction of the law turned 
concrete legal limitations into manipulable policies56 that left field 
commanders with little guidance as to the boundaries of permissible 
treatment of detainees.57 
The most notorious of these memos, written in August 2002, 
construed the provisions of the federal code that criminalize torture58 
to apply only to the infliction of “serious physical damage” that is 
 
Dep’t of Def., Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees 9–10 (Jan. 
22, 2002) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 45. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., OLC, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 
18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A, at 14–22 (Aug. 1, 2002) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 46. Memorandum from Bybee to Gonzales and Haynes, supra note 44, at 32–37. 
 47. Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., OLC, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, to William J. Haynes, II, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Military Interrogation of 
Alien Unlawful Combatants Held Outside the United States 2–10 (Mar. 14, 2003) (on file with 
the Duke Law Journal). 
 48. Id. at 11–47. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Memorandum from Bybee to Gonzales, supra note 45, at 4–5. 
 51. Memorandum from Bybee to Gonzales and Haynes, supra note 44, at 2–10. 
 52. Memorandum from Bybee to Gonzales, supra note 45, at 14–22. 
 53. Id. at 39–46. 
 54. Id. at 31–39. 
 55. S. COMM. ON ARMED SERVS., supra note 42, at xxvii. 
 56. See id. at xiii (“[T]he decision to replace well established military doctrine, i.e., legal 
compliance with the Geneva Conventions, with a policy subject to interpretation, impacted the 
treatment of detainees in U.S. custody.”). 
 57. See id. at xxiv (describing Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez’s issuance and withdrawal of 
several official policies governing the treatment of detainees in Iraq). 
 58. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340B (2006). 
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equivalent to “permanent impairment of a significant body function,” 
“organ failure,” or “death.”59 Shortly after being released by the 
Washington Post in June 2004, 60 the memos provoked a crisis in the 
interpretation of the legitimate boundaries of legal advice.61 Although 
a range of commentators—including legal academics specializing in 
the law of war,62 lawyers at the State Department,63 congressional 
investigators,64 and Yoo’s successor at the OLC65—framed their 
criticisms differently, much of the criticism of the memos centered on 
the tension between the lawyer’s role as advocate and the lawyer’s 
duties as advisor. 
Critics took several different approaches to describing the wrong 
Yoo committed in drafting the memos. One line of criticism held that 
the memos failed to present a balanced view of the definition of 
torture by taking extreme positions and failing to cite countervailing 
 
 59. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., OLC, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 
18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A, in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 41, at 176. 
 60. See Kathleen Clark, Ethical Issues Raised by the OLC Torture Memorandum, 1 J. 
NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 455, 462–63 (2005) (“The legal analysis in the [August 2002] 
[m]emorandum was so indefensible that it could not—and did not—withstand public scrutiny.”); 
see also Mike Allen & Susan Schmidt, Memo on Interrogation Tactics Is Disavowed, WASH. 
POST, June 23, 2004, at A1 (reporting the withdrawal of the August 2002 memorandum); David 
Ignatius, Op-Ed., Small Comfort, WASH. POST, June 15, 2004, at A23 (reporting the release of 
the torture memo on the Washington Post’s website). 
 61. See, e.g., José E. Alvarez, Torturing the Law, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 175, 176–77 
(2006) (“When our high-level torturers act they do not do so by ignoring the law or acting extra-
legally but by systematic and reasoned misinterpretations of the law.”); Michael Hatfield, Fear, 
Legal Indeterminacy, and the American Lawyering Culture, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 511, 515 
(2006) (“[T]he legal profession’s response to [the August 2002 memo] has been an exceptionally 
deep and widespread expression of dismay.”); Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: 
Jurisprudence for the White House, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1687 (2005) (“Reading the 
memoranda of Judge Bybee and Professor Yoo . . . shook my faith in the integrity of the 
community of American jurists.”). 
 62. See, e.g., Alvarez, supra note 61, at 186–98 (criticizing the memo’s conclusions under 
the laws of war); Waldron, supra note 61, at 1693–95 (same). 
 63. See MICHAEL P. SCHARF & PAUL R. WILLIAMS, SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY IN TIMES 
OF CRISIS 192–93 (2010) (relating former State Department Legal Adviser William Taft’s 
reflection that the OLC memos arrived at “conclusions that were not consistent with our treaty 
obligations under the Convention against Torture and our obligations under customary 
international law”). 
 64. See S. COMM. ON ARMED SERVS., supra note 42, at xxvii (“[The August 2002 
memorandum interpreting the torture statute] distorted the meaning and intent of anti-torture 
laws, rationalized the abuse of detainees in U.S. custody[,] and influenced Department of 
Defense determinations as to what interrogation techniques were legal for use during 
interrogations conducted by U.S. military personnel.”). 
 65. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 43, at 144–51 (analyzing the flaws of the August 2002 
memorandum construing the torture statute). 
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precedents.66 As several critics noted, this failure to consider contrary 
authority was compounded by the duties incumbent upon Yoo as an 
advisor to the government. These critics maintained that the 
obligation to provide a balanced assessment increases for a lawyer 
advising the government when that lawyer’s views will not likely be 
subject to review by a court, either because those injured by the 
policy will lack standing to seek a remedy in court or because the 
judiciary will defer to the executive’s claims of secrecy on grounds of 
national security.67 
A second line of criticism, building on the first, drew upon the 
concept that the government attorney has a heightened responsibility 
to consider the full scope of potential harm that the government’s 
contemplated course of action could cause to third parties. This 
heightened duty is most acute when that course of action could result 
in consequences that offend widely shared contemporary definitions 
of morality.68 
 
 66. See, e.g., Alvarez, supra note 61, at 185–86 (“[T]hese memoranda are advocacy briefs 
by ‘can do’ lawyers but certainly not objective examinations of the current treaty obligations of 
the United States.”); Clark, supra note 60, at 462 (“[T]he [August 2002] Memorandum presents 
highly questionable claims as settled law. It does not present either the counter arguments to 
these claims or an assessment of the risk that other legal actors—including courts—would reject 
them.”); Neil M. Peretz, The Limits of Outsourcing: Ethical Responsibilities of Federal 
Government Attorneys Advising Executive Branch Officials, 6 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 23, 49–50 
(2006) (“The government attorneys preparing the memos may have failed to meet their ethical 
responsibility . . . to explore alternative perspectives and to ensure such perspectives were 
represented during the policymaking process.”); see also Adam Liptak, Legal Scholars Criticize 
Memos on Torture, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2004, at A14 (surveying criticisms by prominent legal 
scholars). 
 67. See Peretz, supra note 66, at 37–39 (“Legal advisors to policymakers should not 
zealously advocate because it is unlikely that an equally zealous adversary will arise to oppose 
them. . . . [T]here is often no adversary to counterbalance the government attorney’s 
advocacy . . . .”). See generally WALTER E. DELLINGER, DAWN JOHNSEN, RANDOLPH MOSS, 
CHRISTOPHER SCHROEDER, JOSEPH R. GUERRA, BETH NOLAN, TODD PETERSON, CORNELIA. 
T.L. PILLARD, H. JEFFERSON POWELL, TERESA WYNN ROSEBOROUGH, RICHARD SHIFFRIN, 
WILLIAM MICHAEL TREANOR, DAVID BARRON, STUART BENJAMIN, LISA BROWN, PAMELA 
HARRIS, NEIL KINKOPF, MARTIN LEDERMAN & MICHAEL SMALL, PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE THE 
OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL 2 (2004), available at http://www.acslaw.org/files/2004 programs 
_OLC principles_white paper.pdf (“OLC’s analysis should disclose, and candidly and fairly 
address, the relevant range of legal sources and substantial arguments on all sides of the 
question.”). 
 68. See Jesselyn Radack, Tortured Legal Ethics: The Role of the Government Advisor in the 
War on Terrorism, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 19–30 (2006) (propounding a “morally perilous 
question” doctrine guided by the Eighth Amendment that triggers heightened duties for lawyers 
advising the government); see also Hatfield, supra note 61, at 518–24 (discussing the role of the 
author’s moral views in determining the content of the reasoning in the August 2002 memo); cf. 
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Other criticisms were voiced in the language of mens rea 
requirements found in criminal law statutes. The term “reckless” 
appears in discussions of the memos to describe the state of mind of 
the drafter in regard to the probability that the interrogation policies 
addressed by the memos were illegal.69 Noted international law 
scholar José Alvarez, for example, described the treatment of 
international legal authority in the memo construing the torture 
statute as “cavalier, even reckless.”70 
Each of these critiques corroborates a fourth line of criticism, 
which maintains that Yoo mistook his role as an advisor to the 
government for the role of an attorney representing a client in 
litigation.71 In the former role, the attorney assists the client in 
determining how the client may realize his or her intended purposes 
in conformity with the law, whereas, in the latter, the attorney crafts 
an argument that the client’s conduct falls within the law.72 Such a 
mistake results when the lawyer transposes the duty of zealous 
 
HAZARD & HODES, supra note 8, § 23.4 (describing Rule 2.1 of the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct as contemplating “a moral dialog between autonomous individuals”). 
 69. See, e.g., Liptak, supra note 66 (reporting criticism by Cass Sunstein that the reasoning 
in the August 2002 memo was “just short of reckless”). 
 70. Alvarez, supra note 61, at 186. 
 71. See, e.g., GOLDSMITH, supra note 43, at 149 (relating criticism of the August 2002 
memorandum that “[i]t reads like a bad defense counsel’s brief, not an OLC opinion”); Clark, 
supra note 60, at 458 (“[The memo’s] assertions about the state of the law are so inaccurate that 
they seem to be arguments about what the authors (or the intended recipients) wanted the law 
to be rather than assessments of what the law actually is.”); Radack, supra note 68, at 27 
(reporting criticism of a former Third Circuit Court of Appeals judge that “[t]he position taken 
by the government lawyers in these legal memoranda amount[s] to counseling a client as to how 
to get away with violating the law” (second alteration in original)); Vanessa Blum, Culture of 
Yes: Signing Off on a Strategy, LEGAL TIMES, June 14, 2004, at 12 (quoting former OLC 
attorney Bruce Fein identifying the “problem with” the OLC’s legal advice as being “that you 
start out with a conclusion and then go put together the jigsaw puzzle that makes it legal instead 
of looking for the most persuasive answer under the law”); Stephen Gillers, Tortured Reasoning, 
AM. LAW., July 2004, at 65 (“As an advisor, a lawyer is not an advocate.”); Andrew Rosenthal, 
Editorial Observer, Legal Breach: The Government’s Attorneys and Abu Ghraib, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 30, 2004, at A22 (“[A] more cynical approach [to the law] says that lawyers are simply an 
instrument of policy—get me a legal opinion that permits me to do X. Sometimes a lawyer has 
to say, ‘You just can’t do this.’” (quoting attorney Jeh Johnson)). See generally DELLINGER ET 
AL., supra note 67, at 2 (“OLC should not simply provide an advocate’s best defense of 
contemplated action that OLC actually believes is best viewed as unlawful.”). 
 72. See Fuller & Randall, supra note 38, at 1161 (“Partisan advocacy plays its essential part 
in [litigation], and the lawyer pleading his client’s case may properly present it in the most 
favorable light. A similar resolution of doubts in one direction becomes inappropriate when the 
lawyer acts as counselor.”); see also WOLFRAM, supra note 37, at 691 (“[A] lawyer’s counseling 
can serve as a mechanism of social control by performing the socially desirable function of 
encouraging law compliance on the part of clients.”). 
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representation from the litigation context to the advisory context. The 
danger is that, in an excess of misplaced zeal, the lawyer will guide the 
client into acting illegally.73 
B.  The Enron Scandal 
As in the torture memo controversy, lawyers in the Enron 
scandal were perceived by their critics as having facilitated crimes by 
giving legal advice. According to these critics, Enron’s financial 
collapse in 2001 was precipitated by a corresponding collapse of 
professional competence and integrity among the lawyers advising the 
company.74 In spite of the involvement of Enron’s attorneys at Vinson 
& Elkins in approving transactions and the inadequate disclosures 
that the Department of Justice later prosecuted as crimes,75 the 
attorneys avoided public sanction. Due to the inability of the existing 
professional standards governing the role of corporate counsel76 and 
of the reporting obligations imposed by the securities laws77 to limit 
the advisor’s participation in corporate misdeeds, commentators were 
left without a clear standard for assessing whether the conduct of 
 
 73. See Clark, supra note 60, at 465–67 (contrasting the responsibility of advisors to provide 
balanced legal analysis, or to caution their clients as to unbalanced aspects of their analysis, with 
the liberty of advocates to assert non-frivolous claims). 
 74. See, e.g., WILLIAM C. POWERS, JR., RAYMOND S. TROUBH & HERBERT S. WINOKUR, 
JR., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD 
OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP. 17 (2002) (attributing Enron’s failure to disclose its hedging 
transactions with its affiliated entities in part to “an absence of . . . objective and critical 
professional advice by outside counsel at Vinson & Elkins”); Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D. 
Paton, Lawyers, Ethics, and Enron, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 9, 19 (2002) (“While questions 
about [Vinson & Elkins’] exposure to malpractice suits remain open, the facts available suggest 
that the firm was more than a bystander to corporate misconduct.”). 
 75. See Superseding Indictment, United States v. Fastow, No. H-02-0665 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 
30, 2003), 2003 WL 22331356 (charging Enron executives with 109 counts of fraud, conspiracy, 
obstruction of justice, and other crimes); POWERS ET AL., supra note 74, at 25–26, 44, 51, 65, 72, 
100, 115, 158, 178, 181, 183, 187, 190 (documenting Vinson & Elkins’ involvement in 
transactions and disclosure that became the subject of the indictments against Enron 
executives). 
 76. See Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor After 
Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1185, 1207–15 (2003) (proposing a new conception of the corporate 
advisor’s role in response to the Enron scandal); see also DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID 
LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 498–504 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing the flaws in traditional notions of the 
lawyer’s counseling role). 
 77. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in 
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.), passed in response to the Enron scandal, 
imposed new requirements requiring lawyers to report “evidence of a material violation of 
securities laws or breach of fiduciary duty” to the chief legal counsel or board of directors. Id. § 
307, 116 Stat. at 784. 
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Enron’s lawyers amounted to ethical or criminal violations.78 The 
perception that the lawyers’ failure to provide “objective and critical 
professional advice”79 facilitated the company’s crimes80 provides 
another opportunity to distinguish between appropriate advising and 
advocacy that turns the advisor into an accomplice.81 
Although the Enron transactions that ultimately provoked the 
ensuing scandal were highly complex,82 analysts who reviewed the 
transactions after the scandal erupted recognized that they fell within 
at least three basic categories.83 In one network of transactions, Enron 
arranged the debt-financed purchase of a limited partnership by an 
Enron-related entity without consolidating the partnership onto its 
balance sheets, contrary to accounting rules that required 
consolidation of investment partnerships that lacked adequate equity 
capital.84 In another group of transactions, Enron transferred debts to 
two partnerships managed by Enron executive Andrew Fastow 
shortly before reporting periods ended, only to purchase them back 
after the reporting period was over.85 In a third category, Enron used 
the partnerships managed by Fastow to coordinate so-called hedging 
transactions, in which Enron would acquire assets from investment 
vehicles created by Enron using shares of Enron stock.86 Although 
these exchanges involved no transfer of economic risk, the 
 
 78. See Rhode & Paton, supra note 74, at 17–24, 29 (describing the role of Enron lawyers 
and noting a lack of “appropriate standards of third-party liability for lawyers who passively 
acquiesce in client fraud” in the rules of professional conduct). 
 79. POWERS ET AL., supra note 74, at 17. 
 80. See id. at 26 (“Management and the Board relied heavily on the perceived approval by 
Vinson & Elkins of the structure and disclosure of the transactions. Enron’s Audit and 
Compliance Committee, as well as in-house counsel, looked to it for assurance that Enron’s 
public disclosures were legally sufficient. . . . Vinson & Elkins should have brought a stronger, 
more objective and more critical voice to the disclosure process.”); see also Gordon, supra note 
76, at 1216 (describing the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley “status quo” as one in which “lawyers effectively 
facilitate, or passively acquiesce in and enable corporate frauds, in the name of a noble idea of 
advocacy that has been ludicrously misapplied”). 
 81. See Gordon, supra note 76, at 1204 (criticizing the use, as a defense of the Enron 
lawyers’ conduct, of the notion of the corporate lawyer as “adversary-advocate”). 
 82. See JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF MODERN U.S. CORPORATE 
SCANDALS: FROM ENRON TO REFORM 99 (2006) (“The list of complex Enron structured 
finance transactions is simply too long to examine in any depth.”). 
 83. See POWERS ET AL., supra note 74, at 6–17 (reporting findings on the “Chewco” 
transaction and the “LJM,” “hedging,” and “asset sale” transactions). 
 84. See id. at 6–7 (summarizing the structure and accounting implications of the Chewco 
transaction). 
 85. See id. at 11–12 (summarizing Enron’s asset sale transactions). 
 86. See id. at 13–17 (summarizing issues raised by the hedging transactions). 
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investments received by Enron were reported as bona fide earnings.87 
When Enron finally restated its earnings in 2001 to comply with 
accounting rules, the firm reduced its reported net income by nearly 
twenty percent over the previous four years.88 
Attorneys at Vinson & Elkins advised Enron on each of the 
transactions that became the focus of the subsequent criminal 
prosecutions of the company’s executives.89 The law firm also advised 
the company on compliance with its obligations to disclose 
information about these transactions to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission.90 After Enron Vice President Sherron Watkins raised 
concerns with Chairman Kenneth Lay about the legality of the 
hedging transactions, the company hired Vinson & Elkins to review 
its compliance with its disclosure obligations, even though the law 
firm had advised Enron on these disclosures initially.91 In its 
subsequent nine-page report, the law firm concluded that the 
company’s actions required no further investigation.92 Although the 
law firm knew the details of Enron’s hedging activities due to its role 
in advising Enron on its disclosure obligations,93 the firm’s report 
 
 87. See id. at 14–15 (describing abuses of accounting standards involved in the hedging 
transactions). 
 88. See id. at 3 (describing the financial consequences of Enron’s restatement of earnings). 
 89. See Superseding Indictment, supra note 75, ¶¶ 10–47 (providing a factual basis for 
charges related to Enron executives’ use of the fraudulent hedging transactions); see also 
POWERS ET AL., supra note 74, at 44, 51, 66, 72, 100, 115, 154, 178, 181, 183 (noting Vinson & 
Elkins’ involvement in advising Enron on the Chewco, asset sale, and hedging transactions). 
 90. POWERS ET AL., supra note 74, at 26 (“[Vinson & Elkins] also assisted Enron with the 
preparation of its disclosures of related-party transactions in the proxy statements and the 
footnotes to the financial statements in Enron’s periodic SEC filings.”). 
 91. See id. at 172–77 (discussing Watkins’ objections and the decision to hire Vinson & 
Elkins). The decision to hire Vinson & Elkins and the firm’s decision to take the job were made 
in spite of the fact that the firm would be reviewing its own work. Rhode & Paton, supra note 
74, at 20 (“In agreeing to take on this investigation, Vinson & Elkins opened itself to 
accusations that it would be evaluating its own work.”). 
 92. Destruction of Enron-Related Documents by Andersen Personnel: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th 
Cong. 46–54 (2002) (letter from Max Hendrick, III, Partner, Vinson & Elkins LLP, to James V. 
Derrick, Jr., Executive Vice President & General Counsel, Enron Corp.) (containing Vinson & 
Elkins’ report and recommendations). 
 93. See POWERS ET AL., supra note 74, at 25–26, 115, 182–83 (describing Vinson & Elkins’ 
role as providing “substantial advice” on the disclosures of transactions with Enron’s affiliated 
entities). 
SMITH IN PRINTER PROOF 10/17/2010  10:33:48 PM 
516 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60:499 
dismissed illegal aspects of the transactions as nothing more than 
“[b]ad [c]osmetics.”94 
The Special Investigative Committee commissioned by the 
Enron Board of Directors issued a report (the Powers Report) 
refuting the law firm’s conclusions, finding that the firm’s review was 
“structured with less skepticism than was needed to see through these 
particularly complex transactions.”95 Summarizing its conclusions, the 
Special Investigative Committee attributed the corporation’s failure 
to abide by its disclosure obligations in part to “an absence 
of . . . objective and critical professional advice by outside counsel at 
Vinson & Elkins.”96 The publication of the Powers Report marked 
the beginning of speculation about whether the lawyers’ role as 
Enron’s advisor on the hedging transactions would expose them to 
criminal liability.97 As one commentator framed the question, “Were 
V&E’s lawyers co-conspirators? Or were they merely scribes who 
unknowingly drafted documents that helped Enron fleece its 
shareholders?”98 But the $30 million settlement reached by Vinson & 
Elkins with Enron’s bankruptcy trustee in 2006 ensured that, in the 
absence of a criminal investigation, the scope of the lawyers’ 
complicity would remain a mystery.99 
When considered with the torture memo controversy, Vinson & 
Elkins’ role in Enron’s attempts to evade and abuse corporate 
accounting rules offers a second case in which lawyers were perceived 
as complicit in illegal conduct based on their failure to provide 
“objective and critical professional advice.”100 The Special 
Investigative Committee’s criticism of Vinson & Elkins’ failure to 
 
 94. Destruction of Enron-Related Documents by Andersen Personnel: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, supra 
note 92, at 53. 
 95. POWERS ET AL., supra note 74, at 177. 
 96. Id. at 17. 
 97. See, e.g., Dan Ackman, Enron’s Lawyers: Eyes Wide Shut?, FORBES.COM (Jan. 28, 
2002, 12:16 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2002/01/28/0128veenron.html (noting that “plaintiffs 
and prosecutors could argue V&E ‘turned a blind eye’ . . . and use the [Vinson & Elkins report] 
to draw the lawyers even deeper inside the Enron circle” (quoting Richard Epstein, Professor, 
University of Chicago)); Mike France, Commentary, Close the Lawyer Loophole, BUS. WK., 
Feb. 2, 2004, at 70, 70 (“Corporate lawyers are almost never sent to jail for helping out white-
collar criminals.”). 
 98. Michael Orey, Lawyers: Enron’s Last Mystery, BUSINESSWEEK.COM (June 1, 2006), 
http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/may2006/pi20060531_972686.htm. 
 99. See Ex-Enron Law Firm to Pay $30 Million, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2006, at C5 (reporting 
on the settlement with Enron). 
 100. POWERS ET AL., supra note 74, at 17. 
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adopt the necessary degree of skepticism toward their client’s 
activities mirrors the criticisms of the torture memos’ failure to 
“provide objective legal advice” in analyses that “seem[ed] to be 
arguments about what the authors . . . wanted the law to be rather 
than assessments of what the law actually is.”101 Critics in both cases 
used the apparent bias in the lawyer’s advice as a criterion for 
determining whether the lawyer was complicit in the client’s conduct. 
This method of evaluating lawyers’ advice appeared again in the 
Lincoln Savings & Loan investigation.  
C.  Kaye Scholer and the Lincoln Savings & Loan Investigation 
As in the torture-memo and Enron controversies, the 
enforcement action brought by the Office of Thrift Supervision 
(OTS) against the law firm Kaye Scholer102 provoked fundamental 
questions about the nature of a lawyer’s complicity in a client’s illegal 
conduct. At issue in the disagreement between the firm’s defenders 
and supporters of the enforcement action were the limits on a 
lawyer’s liberty to present unfavorable facts in a favorable light when 
representing a client before a federal bank regulator. The law firm 
claimed that it represented Lincoln in an adversarial setting similar to 
litigation that justified its attempt to shade the facts in the manner 
most favorable to the client.103 The OTS charged that this practice 
violated federal banking regulations that provided penalties for 
knowingly making false or misleading statements to the Federal 
 
 101. Compare, e.g., id. (attributing Enron’s failure to comply with its disclosure obligations 
in part to the “absence of . . . objective and critical professional advice by . . . Vinson & Elkins”), 
with Clark, supra note 60, at 458 (“The [August 2002] memorandum purported to provide 
objective legal advice . . . . Nevertheless, its assertions about the state of the law are so 
inaccurate that they seem to be arguments about what the authors . . . wanted the law to be 
rather than assessments of what the law actually is.”). 
 102. See Notice of Charges and of Hearing for Cease and Desist Orders to Direct 
Restitution and Other Appropriate Relief; Notice of Intention to Remove and Prohibit from 
Participation in the Conduct of the Affairs of Insured Depository Institutions; Notice of 
Intention to Debar from Practice Before the Office of Thrift Supervision, In re Fishbein, OTS 
AP-92-10 (Mar. 1, 1992), reprinted in JONATHAN J. LERNER, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT 
RELATIONSHIP AFTER KAYE, SCHOLER 237 (1992). 
 103. See Steve France, Just Deserts: Don’t Cry for Kaye, Scholer, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 6, 
1992, at 28 (quoting Kaye Scholer’s defense attorney’s observation that the firm defined its 
obligations in terms of litigation because that characterization provided the “‘broadest 
leeway’ . . . to ‘characterize facts in a light favorable to the client and even withhold damaging 
information, unless required by law to provide it’”). 
SMITH IN PRINTER PROOF 10/17/2010  10:33:48 PM 
518 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60:499 
Home Loan Bank Board.104 The distinction between the lawyer’s role 
in advocacy and the lawyer’s role in nonlitigation settings became the 
crux of the disagreement between commentators who supported and 
opposed the OTS investigation. 
Kaye Scholer went to work for Lincoln in 1986, by which time 
the bank had become heavily steeped in the late-1980s savings-and-
loan crisis.105 The Kaye Scholer litigators took a highly aggressive 
stance toward the regulators’ inquiries into the bank’s liquidity, 
describing Lincoln as an “extraordinarily successful, financially 
healthy institution,”106 despite the firm’s knowledge that the bank had 
inflated its earnings through sham transactions, backdated 
investments to take advantage of grandfather clauses in banking 
regulations, and fabricated documents to mislead investigators about 
the bank’s underwriting process.107 
The OTS complaint resulted in a forty-one-million-dollar 
settlement against the law firm and an injunction prohibiting two of 
its partners from practicing before bank regulatory authorities.108 The 
firm never admitted any wrongdoing;109 on the contrary, it maintained 
that its attorneys had acted within the limits proper to “litigation 
counsel” in an adversarial proceeding.110 
The critics of Kaye Scholer’s activities in its representation of 
Lincoln drew on the distinction between advising and advocacy to 
arrive at a notion of a lawyer’s complicity in a client’s illegal activity. 
 
 104. See William H. Simon, The Kaye Scholer Affair: The Lawyer’s Duty of Candor and the 
Bar’s Temptations of Evasion and Apology, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 243 app. (1998) 
(summarizing the OTS charges and the law firm’s responses); see also Susan Beck & Michael 
Orey, They Got What They Deserved, AM. LAW., May 1992, at 68, 74 (characterizing Kaye 
Scholer’s argument that they acted in the role of “litigation counsel” as “an attempt to avoid 
being charged under . . . [t]he bank board reg[ulation] in effect at the time”). 
 105. See Simon, supra note 104, at 246–48 (providing background on the financial climate 
surrounding the Lincoln investigation). 
 106. Beck & Orey, supra note 104, at 68. 
 107. See Simon, supra note 104, at 248–51 (describing the OTS charges against Kaye 
Scholer); Beck & Orey, supra note 104, at 71 (“[N]umerous internal Kaye, Scholer memos 
describe in vivid detail problems with Lincoln’s operations . . . . To the OTS looking for 
evidence that Kaye, Scholer knew about Lincoln’s problems and helped its client hide them, 
these documents must have looked like smoking guns.”). 
 108. France, supra note 103 (describing the terms of the settlement against the law firm and 
the court order against the Kaye Scholer partners who directed the firm’s response to the OTS 
investigation). 
 109. David Margolick, Lawyers Under Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1992, at A1. 
 110. See Beck & Orey, supra note 104, at 74 (reporting the firm’s use of the “litigation 
counsel” argument in its public statements). 
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Commentators who defended the law firm’s conduct heaped criticism 
on the OTS enforcement action,111 asserting that it improperly 
infringed upon the lawyers’ duty of loyalty to their client.112 Analysts 
who supported the enforcement action expressed grave doubts about 
the law firm’s assertion that it represented the bank in an adversarial 
setting similar to litigation.113 According to one critic, “one prominent 
claim in the Kaye Scholer debate was extremely radical. This was the 
firm’s . . . argument that because the firm was ‘litigation’ rather than 
‘regulatory’ counsel, it had a lower standard of responsibility to the 
Bank Board.”114 In the conflict between these opposing views, the 
advocacy-centered conception of the lawyer’s undivided adherence to 
the client’s interests115 and emphasis on the litigator’s duty of zealous 
advocacy116 collided with allegations that the Kaye Scholer lawyers 
were central figures in a “picture . . . of a client rotten to the core and 
a law firm that knew it.”117 
In the torture-memo controversy, the Enron scandal, and the 
Kaye Scholer investigation, the distinction between the lawyer’s roles 
as partisan advocate and as neutral advisor assumed central 
importance. Critics in each controversy focused on curtailing the 
scope of permissible advocacy in contexts outside traditional litigation 
settings.118 Despite substantial differences in the nature of the lawyers’ 
 
 111. See, e.g., Edward Brodsky, The ‘Kaye, Scholer’ Case, N.Y. L.J., May 22, 1992, at 1 
(criticizing the OTS’s “extraordinary action” in freezing Kaye Scholer’s assets during the 
investigation); W. John Moore, Clubbing Counsel, NAT’L J., July 25, 1992, at 1714 (quoting 
Proskauer Rose Goetz & Mendelsohn partners’ position that the investigation “threatens to 
fundamentally change the role of lawyers for, and the relationship of lawyers to, federally 
insured financial institutions”). 
 112. See Amy Stevens & Paulette Thomas, Legal Crisis: How a Big Law Firm Was Brought 
to Its Knees by Zealous Regulators, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 1992, at A1 (describing Kaye Scholer 
partner Peter M. Fishbein “as a litigator who measured his professional worth under a code of 
conduct that demanded unstinting loyalty to the client, [who] wasn’t about to let some 
bureaucrat tell him otherwise”). 
 113. See Simon, supra note 104, at 270–73 (discussing the flaws of Kaye Scholer’s “litigation 
counsel” argument); Beck & Orey, supra note 104, at 74 (“[The] biggest weakness [in Kaye 
Scholer’s position] is its very premise, that this was a litigation, rather than a regulatory, setting. 
Saying it was ‘litigation’ doesn’t make it so.”). 
 114. Simon, supra note 104, at 270. 
 115. See, e.g., Stevens & Thomas, supra note 112 (invoking the notion of “unstinting loyalty 
to the client” as a defense of Kaye Scholer’s conduct). 
 116. See id. (questioning whether a lawyer’s role is “that of [a] zealous advocate for the 
client”). 
 117. Beck & Orey, supra note 104, at 74. 
 118. See, e.g., Fred. C. Zacharias, The Future Structure and Regulation of Law Practice: 
Confronting Lies, Fictions, and False Paradigms in Legal Ethics Regulation, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 
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work in each case,119 commentators in all three cases used the 
distinction between advice and advocacy to determine whether the 
lawyers were complicit in their clients’ conduct. Although the critics 
arrived at a similar conception of the lawyer’s complicity in each case, 
that notion of complicity has yet to be described normatively under 
the professional rules or the criminal law. 
III.  DISTINGUISHING THE PROFESSIONAL RULES AND  
THE CRIMINAL LAW 
The difficulty that critics experienced in articulating a general 
standard of complicity in the torture-memo, Enron, and Kaye Scholer 
cases stems from the fact that both the criminal law and the 
professional rules are ill adapted to the problem of defining lawyers’ 
complicity in general terms. The basic doctrines in these two systems 
remain in conflict over whether the lawyer who acts in a “good faith 
effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the 
law” should be excused.120 As this Part argues, a general standard for 
lawyers’ complicity that fails to accommodate the professional rules’ 
and the criminal law’s respective doctrines of complicity would be 
undesirable because both systems embody important considerations 
for regulating lawyers’ behavior. At the same time, neither system 
adequately reflects the considerations that the other incorporates. 
Instead, their basic constitutive elements differ radically.121 
A.  Origins of the Norms 
The legal profession regulates lawyers’ conduct through 
disciplinary agencies administered by bar organizations or by 
 
829, 855 (2002) (“[T]he Kaye, Scholer incident called into question the codes’ paradigm of 
lawyers as advocates.” (footnote omitted)); Gillers, supra note 71, at 65 (“As an advisor, a 
lawyer is not an advocate.”). 
 119. This convergence is particularly notable in light of the disparate roles played by the 
lawyers in each case. The Kaye Scholer attorneys mediated between Lincoln Savings & Loan 
and a federal banking regulator, Vinson & Elkins advised on Enron’s compliance with its 
disclosure obligations regarding transactions that were structured by the law firm, and the 
torture memos were penned by a government attorney interpreting the limitations imposed on 
interrogations of detainees held by the CIA and the military. 
 120. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2009). For a discussion of these 
doctrines, see supra Introduction. 
 121. See Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1389, 
1409–27 (1992) (discussing how the law and the professional rules advance different conceptions 
of the lawyer’s role and appropriate behavior). 
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independent state agencies.122 Although each state bar configures its 
professional-discipline system differently, standards promulgated by 
the American Bar Association (ABA) have influenced both the 
substantive rules for lawyer discipline and the procedures for 
administering these rules.123 The ABA standards impose sanctions for 
violations of a lawyer’s duties to clients, to the public, to the legal 
system, and to the profession.124 In most jurisdictions, a bar 
disciplinary agency hears allegations of lawyer misconduct and then 
brings a complaint upon finding sufficient preliminary evidence of 
misconduct.125 The hearing “is a relatively formal version of 
administrative law procedure,” and the lawyer is afforded procedural 
guarantees such as assistance of counsel, limited discovery, and the 
right to subpoena and cross-examine witnesses.126 The authority of the 
bar agency to bring these complaints and of the courts to hear them 
derives from the traditional assertion by the courts of an inherent 
authority to regulate the conditions of legal practice.127 
The standards of professional discipline reflect the legal 
profession’s view of the limits of permissible conduct by lawyers.128 
The judgments of wrongdoing and the consequences assigned to these 
wrongful acts originate with the members of the profession, acting 
without input from or modification by the general public.129 Although 
a primary goal of the professional-discipline system is to protect the 
 
 122. See RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 76, at 951 (“[A]bout half the states have disciplinary 
agencies that are nominally independent of the organized bar . . . .”). 
 123. See id. at 965 (“The ABA Standards are the most common source of guidance in the 
sanctioning process.”). 
 124. See STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS § 1.1 (1992) (identifying 
enforcement of duties owed “to clients, the public, the legal system, and the legal profession” as 
the purpose of disciplinary proceedings). 
 125. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., SUSAN P. KONIAK & ROGER C. CRAMTON, THE LAW 
AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 918 (3d ed. 1999) (describing the use of a “preliminary 
prosecutorial review to determine probable cause” in lawyer disciplinary proceedings conducted 
in most jurisdictions). 
 126. Id. (quoting Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Cameron Beard, Comment, A Lawyer’s 
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Professional Disciplinary Proceedings, 95 YALE L.J. 1060, 
1066–67 (1987)). 
 127. See COMM. ON DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, AM. BAR ASS’N, LAWYER 
REGULATION FOR A NEW CENTURY 1–9 (1992) (providing background in support of the 
recommendation that the judiciary, rather than the legislature, should conduct professional 
regulation of lawyers). 
 128. See ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. annot. (2007) (“The 
Rules of Professional Conduct govern lawyer discipline.”). 
 129. See RHODE, supra note 37, at 145 (“Bar codes of conduct claim to protect the public, 
but the public has had almost no voice in their formulation or enforcement.”). 
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public from the peculiar forms of harm that lawyers can inflict,130 the 
rules reflect the bar’s conception of the public’s interest in protection 
from this harm, rather than the public’s assessment of its vulnerability 
to lawyer misconduct and the appropriate norms and punishments 
that regulate such behavior.131 
In contrast, publicly accountable legislatures enact criminal laws 
through a process designed to reflect public attitudes.132 Although not 
every piece of legislation successfully embodies these attitudes, the 
criminal law as a whole may be expected to better reflect the public’s 
views as a consequence of this public accountability. 133 
B.  The Interests Served 
The criminal law and the professional rules differ in terms of the 
interests that each system is intended to serve. Lawyers occupy a 
position of privilege134 and responsibility135 in relation to the rest of the 
public. Their tenure in this position continues with the permission of 
the general public,136 which could curtail or eliminate this privilege at 
any time. The professional-discipline system therefore serves the 
 
 130. See STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS § 1.1 (1992) (“The purpose of 
lawyer discipline proceedings is to protect the public and the administration of justice from 
lawyers who have not discharged . . . their professional duties.”). 
 131. See RHODE, supra note 37, at 143 (arguing that the legal profession’s “freedom from 
external accountability too often serves the profession at the expense of the public”); Koniak, 
supra note 121, at 1395–1402 (describing the law and the professional rules as distinct but 
interdependent normative systems). 
 132. See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 150 (1988) (“In 
terms of structure, the combination of a representative conception, highly diverse training and 
experience, and responsiveness and accountability to the citizenry on an ongoing basis provides 
legitimacy to legislative rules . . . .”). 
 133. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003) (confronting the limitations on 
the power of a political majority to use the criminal laws to enforce its moral views); JOEL 
FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING 100 (1970) (“[I]t can be said that punishment expresses the 
judgment . . . of the community that what the criminal did was wrong.”); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The 
Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 404 (Summer 1958) (“What 
distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction and all that distinguishes it . . . is the judgment of 
community condemnation which accompanies and justifies its imposition.”). 
 134. See STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS theoretical framework, para. 1 
(recognizing that, by virtue of their expertise, lawyers have been given the power to make 
certain types of decisions for the public). 
 135. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl., para. 1 (2009) (acknowledging that 
lawyers have a “special responsibility for the quality of justice” in relation to the general public). 
 136. See id. para. 12–13 (recognizing that government regulation of the legal profession is 
unnecessary “[t]o the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their professional calling” and 
that failure to observe these obligations “compromises the independence of the profession” 
(emphasis added)). 
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interest of the profession in ensuring that the public does not become 
so outraged by lawyers’ abuses of their privileged status that it 
curtails or eliminates these privileges.137 In this respect, the 
professional-discipline system protects the legal profession from the 
public as much as it protects the public from the legal profession.138 
The criminal law’s scope is broader: it serves the interests of the 
public in enforcing behavioral norms that the public regards as 
necessary to maintain the integrity of the polity.139 General public 
norms and enforcement systems, criminal and otherwise, have a 
superior status to the professional-discipline system because the legal 
profession exists only by virtue of the presence of substantive law.140 
Thus, although both the professional-discipline system and the 
criminal law are concerned with protecting the public’s interests, the 
criminal law’s role is more primary. 
C.  The Subject of Sanctions 
The professional-discipline system and the criminal law differ 
also in the subject upon which each imposes sanctions as a 
consequence of violating their respective norms. The most vivid 
expression of the bar’s self-regulatory powers is its ability to limit a 
lawyer’s permission to continue in the practice of law. The ABA has 
approved a spectrum of sanctions, from private admonition and 
limited probation at the lenient end of the spectrum to disbarment at 
the severe end.141 These penalties exert their power over the lawyer 
 
 137. See WOLFRAM, supra note 37, at 79 (“There is reason to think . . . that a strong 
motivation for lawyer discipline is to reassure a doubtful public that notorious instances of 
lawyer depredation are being handled appropriately.”). 
 138. See Zacharias, supra note 118, at 858 (“[O]ne of the ABA’s express goals in developing 
professional regulation has been to supplant and obviate the need for regulation by lay 
institutions.”); James C. Turner & Suzanne M. Mishkin, Time for a Whupping: Across the 
Country, Attorney Discipline Systems Disgrace the Profession, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 18, 2003, at 
58 (noting that the District of Columbia Bar Agency’s mission to “protect the public and the 
courts from unethical conduct by” lawyers while also “protect[ing] members of the D.C. Bar” 
requires disciplinary bodies to perform “conflicting missions”). 
 139. See Hart, supra note 133, at 410 (“[I]t is the criminal law which defines the minimum 
conditions of man’s responsibility to his fellows and holds him to that responsibility.”). 
 140. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 8, § 5.12 (describing the professional rules’ 
incorporation of and deference to criminal norms). But see Koniak, supra note 121, at 1410 
(observing that the public law may depend upon the legal profession for its existence as much as 
the bar depends upon the law). 
 141. See STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS § 2.1 (1992) (defining the scope 
of sanctions); RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 76, at 965 (“The ABA standards are the most 
common source of guidance in the sanctioning process.”). 
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through his or her license to practice law.142 In this respect, the 
professional-discipline system’s sanctions address the lawyer’s license 
and coerce the lawyer by limiting his or her permission to use that 
license,143 while leaving more fundamental entitlements, such as 
freedom of movement and civic participation, untouched. 
In contrast, the criminal law exerts a coercive influence that 
reaches deeper and more widely than the scope of professional 
sanction. Instead of targeting the lawyer’s privileges as a lawyer, the 
criminal law’s sanctions target the lawyer’s privileges as a citizen. As a 
corollary of this wider spectrum of available penalties, the criminal 
law can vindicate a broader array of social interests by imposing 
reciprocal penalties in response to violations of those interests.144 
Moreover, because the criminal law’s penalties limit the individual’s 
ability not merely to ply a trade but also to continue to participate in 
the community, those penalties have a deeper coercive influence on 
the individual.145 The criminal law thus exceeds the professional-
discipline system in the breadth of interests it serves and the potency 
of the penalties it imposes in response to violations of those interests. 
D.  The Purposes of Sanctions 
In a section entitled “Purposes of Lawyer Discipline 
Proceedings,” the authors of the draft ABA Standards for Imposing 
Lawyer Sanctions asserted that courts do not perceive punishment as 
the purpose of the disciplinary system.146 This perception is puzzling in 
light of the similarity of the means and purposes of imposing 
sanctions in the criminal and professional systems.147 According to the 
 
 142. The penalties imposed by lawyer disciplinary proceedings apply only to the lawyer’s 
professional privileges. See STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS §§ 2.2–2.8 (listing 
forms of sanctions). 
 143. Id. 
 144. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (2006) (instructing the sentencing judge to consider the 
need for the sentence imposed “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for 
the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense”). 
 145. See Herbert Wexler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1097, 
1098 (1952) (“[P]enal law governs the strongest force that we permit official agencies to bring to 
bear on individuals.”); cf. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347–48 (1971) (explaining that the 
rule of lenity originates partly in recognition of the especially severe effects of criminal 
punishment in constraining the individual). 
 146. STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS § 1.1; see also WOLFRAM, supra note 
37, at 81 (“Modern courts have repeatedly observed that ‘lawyer discipline is not intended to 
punish the offending lawyer but to protect the public.’” (citation omitted)). 
 147. See RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 76, at 956 (“[M]uch lawyer discipline seems to fit 
within the classic justifications of punishment: incapacitation, rehabilitation, and deterrence.”). 
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ABA Standards, an overriding purpose of the professional-discipline 
system is to protect the public.148 As subsidiary purposes, this system 
also seeks to protect the “integrity of the legal system,” to “deter 
further unethical conduct,” to “rehabilitate” the lawyer being 
sanctioned, and to “deter unethical behavior among all members of 
the profession” through the example set by penalizing individual 
lawyers.149 
This commentary confuses means with ends. Although 
protecting the public and the legal system are appropriately viewed as 
ends, the methods of deterrence and rehabilitation are better 
understood as means of achieving these ends. Like the professional-
discipline system, the criminal-justice system pursues the purpose of 
public protection in administering penalties150 and uses the means of 
deterrence and rehabilitation to achieve these ends. In both systems, 
the fundamental aim of the imposition of a penalty is to realign the 
individual’s behavior with the requirements of the normative 
framework that the penalty enforces.151 In light of these substantive 
similarities, the sanctions imposed by the professional-discipline 
system should be recognized as a form of punishment to the same 
extent as the sanctions imposed by the criminal law. 
E.  The Means of Enforcement 
Standards for the professional conduct of lawyers are enforced 
through state disciplinary systems.152 The ABA’s standards of 
professional discipline, which serve as the basis for the disciplinary 
systems in most jurisdictions,153 are predicated on the theory that a 
lawyer’s primary responsibility runs to the client.154 As a consequence, 
the mechanics of the state professional-discipline systems are 
 
 148. STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS § 1.1. 
 149. Id. 
 150. See SANFORD H. KADISH, STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER & CAROL S. STEIKER, CRIMINAL 
LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 1 (8th ed. 2007) (“The criminal justice system is society’s primary 
mechanism for enforcing standards of conduct designed to protect the safety and security of 
individuals and the community.”). 
 151. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 3, at 12 (“[C]riminal law[] aims to shape people’s 
conduct along lines which are beneficial to society . . . .”). 
 152. See STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS preface, para. 2 (noting that 
many states have adopted the ABA Standards and that the ABA’s Standing Committee on 
Professional Discipline continues to assist state discipline systems in implementing the 
standards). 
 153. See supra note 9. 
 154. STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS theoretical framework, para. 3. 
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designed primarily to vindicate the grievances of clients harmed by 
lawyers’ misconduct.155 
The state professional-discipline systems’ reliance on complaints 
by clients renders them incapable of dealing with situations in which 
lawyers aid and abet their clients’ crimes.156 Because the client is, by 
definition, the primary criminal actor, the client has no incentive to 
refer the lawyer’s role as aider and abettor to the bar. Moreover, 
because the practitioners who are most likely to have information 
about the lawyer’s misconduct are the lawyer’s closest associates, 
personal loyalties often deter other attorneys from referring cases to 
the bar.157 
Bar counsel can obtain information from other sources that 
mitigates this dependency on client referrals. In some states, for 
example, bar counsel may initiate investigations independently, 
although the lack of adequate resources frequently prevents them 
from exercising this power.158 Consumer organizations also may detect 
instances of misconduct or assist members of the public in submitting 
complaints.159 But although these additional resources supplement 
client complaints as sources of information about lawyer misconduct, 
 
 155. See RHODE, supra note 37, at 159 (“[B]ar agencies depend almost entirely on 
complaints from clients . . . as a basis for disciplinary investigations.”); see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 49–50 (1998) (describing duties owed to 
clients); id. § 51 (limiting the range of nonclients to whom a lawyer owes a duty of care). 
 156. Cf. RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 76, at 952 (“[R]elatively few clients have sufficient 
incentives or information to initiate disciplinary proceedings.”). 
 157. See STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS preface, para. 9 (“[In 1970], 
[o]ne of the most significant problems in lawyer discipline was the reluctance of lawyers and 
judges to report misconduct. That same problem exists today.”); HAZARD ET AL., supra note 
125, at 927 (noting that the duty to report professional misconduct imposed by the Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct “is widely ignored” among lawyers); RHODE, supra note 37, at 160 
(describing a “‘there but for the Grace of God go I’ attitude” among judges and bar leaders that 
deters reporting). 
 158. See RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 76, at 952. (“[D]isciplinary agencies are generally 
underfunded and understaffed. . . . The absence of resources also prevents agencies from 
undertaking independent investigations and limits the assistance that they can provide to 
individuals who wish to file grievances.”). 
 159. See, e.g., Using a Lawyer: Don’t Hire a Legal Professional Before Reading this Book, 
LEGAL REFORMER, Jan.–Mar. 2009, at 1, available at http://www.halt.org/the_legal_reformer/ 
2009/pdf/TLR-Winter09.pdf (advertising legal consumer resource providing information about 
professional discipline). Civil society groups have referred complaints to state bar associations 
about the conduct of lawyers involved in creating the United States’ interrogation policies under 
the Bush administration, including John Yoo. See Justin Blum, Activists Seek Disbarment of 
Bush Lawyers Over Interrogations, BLOOMBERG (May 18, 2009, 2:00 PM EDT), http:// 
www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=washingtonstory&sid=aIpMTqMafwrw (reporting the 
submission of complaints against Yoo and Jay Bybee). 
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they cannot displace bar disciplinary agencies’ primary reliance on 
client referrals.160 
In the absence of effective protections in the professional-
discipline system against lawyers’ facilitation of their clients’ crimes, 
the role of the criminal law in preventing lawyers from acting as 
accomplices increases in importance.161 The imposition of criminal 
liability upon lawyers acting as accomplices furthers the purposes of 
both the criminal law and the professional rules, which prohibit 
lawyers from assisting their clients in committing crimes.162 The lack of 
incentive for lawyers and clients to refer cases to the bar, however, 
severely hampers the bar’s efficacy in addressing cases where lawyers 
act as accomplices. These structural shortcomings in the professional-
discipline system distinguish criminal prosecution as the better 
method of enforcing the prohibition on assisting criminal conduct. 
IV.  A GENERAL STANDARD FOR LAWYER COMPLICITY 
The dissimilarity between the origins of the criminal law and the 
professional rules, the means of their enforcement, the subject of 
their sanctions, and the interests they serve163 raises the problem that 
if one system operates without regard for the values embedded in the 
other, the application of that system in individual cases might 
undermine the values served by its counterpart.164 Under the 
professional rules, the concept of advising in good faith may shield 
the lawyer from sanction, particularly if the advice was given in 
 
 160. See RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 76, at 949 (“[D]isciplinary complaint 
processes . . . rely almost exclusively on clients as a source of information about ethical 
violations.”). 
 161. Cf. RHODE, supra note 37, at 144 (“Without external checks, [lawyers who regulate 
other lawyers] too often lose perspective about the points at which occupational and societal 
interests conflict.”). 
 162. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2009) (“A lawyer shall not counsel 
a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or 
fraudulent . . . .”). 
 163. See supra Part III.A–E. 
 164. See Bruce A. Green, The Criminal Regulation of Lawyers, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 327, 
353 (1998) (“In some situations . . . there is a tension between the criminal law and professional 
norms derived from other sources. In the rare case, this occurs because the criminal law 
proscribes conduct that would otherwise be . . . required by professional norms.”); cf. Koniak, 
supra note 121, at 1478–87 (describing conflicts between professional norms and the law); 
Zacharias, supra note 118, at 870 (“[T]he failure to identify either the policies or reality of 
disciplinary enforcement makes more difficult the task of coordinating discipline with other 
methods of sanctioning misconduct.”). 
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regard to a complex legal question;165 however, in most situations, the 
basic doctrine of accomplice liability in the criminal law does not 
recognize this legal mistake as a defense.166 
The torture-memo controversy, Vinson & Elkins’ role in the 
Enron scandal, and the debate surrounding the OTS investigation of 
Kaye Scholer call for a reconsideration of the standard of complicity 
that applies to lawyers.167 Unless the professional-discipline system is 
wrong to excuse the lawyer who advises in good faith, the standard of 
complicity that developed in these cases must be refined to preserve 
consistency with the professional rules’ exception for lawyers acting 
in good faith. 
A.  The Advising-Complicity Standard 
In the torture-memo, Enron, and Kaye Scholer controversies, the 
distinction between the lawyer’s roles as advisor and as advocate 
pervaded the commentators’ critiques.168 These critics’ distinction 
between advice and advocacy separates the lawyer who influences a 
client to commit a crime or facilitates a client’s criminal conduct from 
the lawyer whose advice respects the limits that the law imposes upon 
the client’s wishes.169 
The central challenge for courts and prosecutors in distinguishing 
between appropriate advice and advocacy of criminal activity is 
determining an evidentiary standard that can assist in evaluating 
whether the lawyer intended to further the client’s illegal activity. A 
 
 165. See supra Part I. 
 166. See Kadish, supra note 1, at 346 (discussing the derivative nature of accomplice 
liability). 
 167. See supra Part III. 
 168. Other commentators have analyzed this distinction using the language of “boundaries” 
and “edges,” implying that the lawyer who blurs the distinction engages in misconduct. See, e.g., 
WOLFRAM, supra note 37, at 692 (examining the obligations of lawyers advising their clients at 
the “knife’s-edge limits of the law”); Joel S. Newman, Legal Advice Toward Illegal Ends, 28 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 287, 290 (1994) (“In substantive law cases, courts have struggled to draw the line 
between mere advice, which does not involve the lawyer in criminal activity and liability, and 
some further, active participation, which does.”); Michael E. Tigar, What Lawyers, What Edge?, 
36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 521, 527 (2007) (proposing the distinction between advice and advocacy as 
a “duality” that contributes to a definition of permissible and impermissible lawyer conduct). 
This conception is also featured in some model rules. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE 
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 8 cmt. b (1998) (observing that a lawyer acting as an advisor 
“may . . . cross the divide between appropriate counseling and criminal activity”). 
 169. Cf. Newman, supra note 168, at 290 (locating the “critical distinction” between culpable 
and innocent advising activity referred to in Comment 6 to Model Rule 1.2 in the content of the 
advice given by the lawyer). 
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successful standard would address the evidentiary problem of 
establishing what facts and circumstances provide evidence that the 
lawyer intended to advance actions by the client that the lawyer knew 
to be illegal.170 This Note proposes a standard for determining 
whether a lawyer’s conduct crossed the boundary from advice into 
complicity that focuses on three elements of the lawyer’s activity: 
first, the lawyer’s knowledge of the client’s intended course of 
conduct; second, the lawyer’s knowledge of the indeterminacy of the 
law governing the client’s conduct;171 and third, the nature of the legal 
advice provided by the lawyer to the client. If the legal advice is 
highly imbalanced in relation to the lawyer’s knowledge of both the 
client’s purpose and the indeterminacy of the law, this standard would 
allow the inference that the advice could not have been intended to 
aid the client in conforming to the law. Under these circumstances, a 
jury could find that the lawyer intended to aid the client in 
accomplishing the client’s criminal purposes.172 
This advising-complicity framework attempts to replicate the 
success of the criminal law’s prohibitions of fraud by focusing judicial 
analysis on elements of mens rea that effectively foreclose the 
possibility that the lawyer acted in good faith. Just as proof of 
fraudulent intent is necessary to sustain a fraud conviction,173 the 
advising-complicity framework requires a combination of factors that, 
if proven, tend to negate any claim of good faith. By requiring proof 
of a mental state that precludes a finding of good faith, this 
framework achieves the effect of the basic definitions of complicity 
found in both the criminal law and the professional standards. It 
embraces criminal norms to the extent that it provides a methodology 
for determining the circumstances in which a lawyer intentionally 
facilitates a client’s crime, while simultaneously incorporating the 
interests of professional discipline by refining the analysis of the 
 
 170. See generally LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 3, at 225–27 (discussing proof of intent and 
the doctrine of “presumed intent”). 
 171. Cf. WOLFRAM, supra note 37, at 695 (identifying the elements of knowledge and legal 
indeterminacy as principal factors in determining whether a lawyer intentionally engaged in 
criminal conduct in violation of Model Rule 1.2(d)). 
 172. See id. at 693 (“[L]awyers can indeed be accomplices in crimes by giving their clients 
legal advice for the purpose of aiding or assisting the client in a project known to consist of acts 
constituting a criminal offense.”). 
 173. See, e.g., United States v. Cavin, 39 F.3d 1299, 1306 (5th Cir. 1994) (requiring proof of 
fraudulent intent to sustain a conviction of conspiracy to commit fraud). 
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lawyer’s intent and thereby shielding from criminal liability the 
lawyer who advises a client in good faith. 
1. The First Element: Knowledge of the Client’s Intended 
Conduct.  To have the requisite mental state for accomplice liability, 
the alleged accomplice must have had the intention to assist the client 
in carrying out a criminal objective.174 Direct proof of intent is difficult 
to obtain in the case of a lawyer acting in an advisory capacity.175 
Therefore, the factfinder must make an inference of the lawyer’s 
intent to assist the commission of a crime from the circumstances.176 
The advisor who has been notified of the client’s proposed course of 
conduct satisfies a prerequisite for accomplice liability, namely that 
the accomplice know the goal pursued by the primary actor.177 The 
lawyer’s knowledge in this situation enables the lawyer to better 
assess the client’s motives in requesting the advice and to anticipate 
how the advice will be used.178 In this position, the lawyer is able to 
evaluate how an opinion on the legality of the client’s proposed 
conduct must be written to steer the client away from illegal action. 
Knowledge in this scenario is a question of degree. The extent of 
the lawyer’s factual knowledge may vary from having no knowledge 
at all of what the client intends to do, to having a basic understanding 
of the range of possible actions the client is contemplating, to having 
intimate knowledge of the details of the conduct in question, perhaps 
because the client is already engaged in the conduct or because of the 
lawyer’s involvement in planning it.179 
 
 174. Kadish, supra note 1, at 346–49. 
 175. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 8, § 1.23 (“It is impossible to look into a lawyer’s 
head, and it is unacceptable simply to take her word for her state of mind when the probity of 
her own conduct is at issue.”). 
 176. See id. (“[C]ircumstantial evidence must also be the (sole) basis for inferring a lawyer’s 
actual knowledge or belief . . . .”); see also LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 3, at 226 (noting that a 
criminal defendant’s intentions “must be gathered from his words (if any) and actions in the 
light of all the surrounding circumstances”). 
 177. See Kadish, supra note 1, at 346–49 (discussing the accomplice’s intent to further the 
primary actor’s goal). 
 178. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 8, § 5.13 (“[T]he problem [in providing advice on 
suspicious activity] is to assess . . . the level of certainty that the client will actually misuse the 
information.”); WOLFRAM, supra note 37, at 696 (“A lawyer, on the basis of then known facts, 
might legitimately begin a representation in furtherance of a client enterprise thought to be 
lawful. If the lawyer later discovers facts indicating that the enterprise is unlawful, the latter 
state of knowledge generates a new duty and the lawyer may no longer assist the client.”). 
 179. Cf. Hazard, supra note 16, at 672 (“It is sometimes suggested that . . . a lawyer cannot 
‘know’ what a client intends. This suggestion is either disingenuous or absurd. . . . [T]he practice 
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As the detail and specificity of the lawyer’s knowledge increases, 
the lawyer’s understanding of how the advice must be tailored to 
avoid illegal activity also increases. Moreover, as the extent of the 
lawyer’s knowledge increases, the propriety of characterizing the 
lawyer’s opinions as advocacy increases, because advocating a certain 
course of conduct becomes more feasible as one’s understanding of 
that conduct improves. Knowledge of the client’s intended conduct 
constitutes one prerequisite to showing that the lawyer has crossed 
the advising-complicity line. 
2. The Second Element: Knowledge of the Risk of Illegality.  The 
second element required to demonstrate that the advising lawyer 
acted as an accomplice is proof that the legal doctrine governing the 
client’s activities alerted the lawyer to the heightened probability that 
the client’s conduct was illegal. This element requires a factfinder’s 
inference that the lawyer actually became aware of the risk of 
illegality.180 
This element of the evidentiary standard assumes that, where the 
legality of the proposed course of conduct poses a new question of 
law or is otherwise highly contested or unclear, the lawyer would 
understand that the need for balanced advice would be greater than if 
the law were settled. A standard that requires the lawyer to provide a 
more balanced view of the law in such instances is entirely consistent 
with the lawyer’s duty to give the client a complete assessment of the 
risk that the client’s conduct will be determined to be illegal.181 Failure 
to discharge this obligation in spite of knowledge of the law would 
corroborate the inference that the lawyer intended to assist the client 
in acting outside the boundaries of the law. 
A lawyer advising a client to engage in contemplated action that 
is similar to crimes that are considered mala in se would also support 
the inference that the advising lawyer was aware of the risk that the 
conduct was criminal.182 Mala in se crimes—like burglary or murder—
 
of law is based on practical knowledge . . . . The question, therefore, is what degree of certainty 
imposes legal obligations on one who ‘knows’?”). 
 180. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 8, § 1.23 (“Even where a violation requires proof of 
[actual] ‘knowledge,’ the circumstances may be such that a disciplinary authority will infer that a 
lawyer must have known.”). 
 181. See Clark, supra note 60, at 466–67 (discussing the advisor’s professional obligation to 
advise the client of the potential that the client’s proposed course of conduct is illegal). 
 182. See Hazard, supra note 16, at 672 (“The narrowest connotation of illegality is conduct 
violative of the criminal law that is mala in se. Although mala in se has no precise definition, it 
generally comprehends conduct that any civilized society would regard as obnoxious . . . .”). 
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are intuitively recognized as wrongful and were usually proscribed at 
common law, in contrast with offenses that are wrongful simply 
because they are created by statute or regulation.183 Criminal 
violations of jus cogens norms under international law, such as the 
prohibition against torture, are also proscribed due to their 
fundamental wrongfulness rather than their incompatibility with a 
regulatory system and should be included among the crimes that are 
considered mala in se.184 The similarity of the proposed conduct to 
mala in se crimes would constitute notice for the lawyer that the 
conduct in question was actually criminal.185 
3. The Third Element: Imbalance or Extremity in the Presentation 
of the Legal Opinion.  Whereas the first two elements of the 
framework address the lawyer’s knowledge and therefore go to the 
question of mens rea, the final element considers the lawyer’s actions 
taken in light of that knowledge. The key determinant in this portion 
of the advising-complicity analysis is the quality of imbalance in the 
advice given by the lawyer.186 This element addresses the difference 
between the advisor’s duty to present a neutral assessment of how the 
law applies to the client’s proposed course of conduct and the 
advocate’s license to argue the law in a manner that favors the 
conduct that the client seeks to defend in court.187 The more 
imbalanced the lawyer’s advice becomes, the less it retains the 
 
 183. See generally LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 3, at 32–35 (distinguishing mala in se 
offenses from those that are mala prohibita). 
 184. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Furund’ija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 154 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998) (“[T]he jus cogens nature of the prohibition 
against torture articulates the notion that the prohibition has now become one of the most 
fundamental standards of the international community.”). 
 185. Cf. Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the 
Jurisprudence and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545, 1578 (1995) (proposing a rule 
making the malum in se status of a client’s proposed activity a factor in determining whether the 
lawyer must refuse to give advice). 
 186. Cf. WOLFRAM, supra note 37, at 692 (“[A] client may be impelled . . . to aggressively 
push legality to its limits, and possibly beyond. It would be improbable that a lawyer could 
perform the lawyerly function of advice-giving in such a situation in the same way in which a 
lawyer advises on legally and morally unquestionable transactions.”). 
 187. See Fuller & Randall, supra note 38, at 1161 (“Partisan advocacy plays [an] essential 
part [in litigation], and the lawyer pleading his client’s case may properly present it in the most 
favorable light. A similar resolution of doubts in one direction becomes inappropriate when the 
lawyer acts as counselor. The reasons that justify and even require partisan advocacy in the trial 
of a cause do not grant any license to the lawyer to participate as legal adviser in a line of 
conduct that is . . . of doubtful legality.”). 
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neutrality implicit in the advisory role188 and the more it assumes the 
bias inherent in advocacy.189 Of course, the more the lawyer’s work 
resembles advocacy, the more it becomes appropriate to attribute to 
the lawyer an intent to influence, induce, or provoke the client to 
engage in particular conduct.190 Thus, the more the lawyer’s advice 
resembles advocacy, the more appropriate it becomes to conclude 
that the lawyer acted as an accomplice. 
Determining whether the lawyer’s advice violated the advising-
complicity standard depends upon the three factors discussed in this 
Part. The question is whether, in light of the lawyer’s knowledge of 
the client’s conduct and of the status of the law, the advice given by 
the lawyer is so imbalanced as to support an inference that it was 
intended not to assist the client in complying with the law but to assist 
the client in violating it.191 An affirmative answer to this question 
would indicate that the lawyer had breached the distinction between 
advising and advocacy and participated as an accomplice in the 
client’s illegal act. 
B.  Impossibility of Good Faith Under the Proposed Advising-
Complicity Standard 
By requiring that the lawyer knew the client’s intended purpose 
and knew that the law governing that purpose was ambiguous or 
unsettled and yet gave advice that failed to warn of the probability 
that the client’s conduct was illegal, the advising-complicity 
framework adds to the criminal law’s basic doctrine of complicity by 
requiring proof that tends to exclude the possibility that the lawyer 
acted in good faith. In doing so, the framework replicates the effect of 
 
 188. See Hazard, supra note 16, at 671 (describing “unsuggestive advice” as “the least 
instrumental form of assistance that a lawyer can provide a client” in pursuing an unlawful 
objective). 
 189. See WOLFRAM, supra note 37, at 697 (“[A] lawyer must avoid replacing a sound 
professional judgment about the limits of the law with a wished-for ambiguity in legal 
proscriptions in a one-sided search for justification for a client’s dubious projects.”). 
 190. This advocacy, whether it is characterized as deliberate influence, inducement, or 
provocation, amounts to more than mere “advice.” See MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS’ 
ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 60 (1975) (asserting that Code of Professional 
Responsibility DR 7–102(A)(7), which prohibits lawyers from counseling or assisting their 
clients in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal, requires “an active kind of participation in 
the client’s illegal act, going beyond merely giving advice about the law”). 
 191. Cf. Clark, supra note 60, at 458 (“[The torture memo’s] assertions about the state of the 
law are so inaccurate that they seem to be arguments about what the authors . . . wanted the law 
to be rather than assessments of what the law actually is.”). 
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fraud statutes, which impose mens rea requirements that exclude the 
possibility that the defendant acted in good faith.192 
The lawyer would not be considered complicit in the client’s 
crime if any of the proposed standard’s three required elements were 
not met. If the lawyer did not have sufficient knowledge of the client’s 
purpose to appreciate the risk that it was illegal, the lawyer would not 
be complicit. Conversely, if the lawyer had intimate knowledge of the 
client’s purpose but did not understand the controlling law, the 
lawyer would not be complicit. Finally, even if the lawyer possessed 
detailed knowledge of the client’s purpose and possessed expert 
familiarity with the relevant law, if the lawyer gave advice that 
warned of the risk that the conduct in question was illegal, no 
inference of intent to further a criminal purpose could follow. Only 
when all three elements are present could a jury determine that the 
lawyer knowingly intended to facilitate a criminal act and convict the 
lawyer as an accomplice to the client’s crime. 
CONCLUSION 
Formulating a general standard of complicity for the lawyer 
acting in an advising role raises difficult problems in reconciling the 
criminal law’s model of complicity with the professional rules’ excuse 
for the advisor who acts in good faith. In spite of these difficulties, the 
inconsistency between the standards of complicity in the criminal law 
and the professional rules must be confronted if the different norms 
and interests preserved by either system of rules are to remain 
uncompromised. By developing a normative standard that draws on 
the distinction between advice and advocacy to address the problem 
of determining the lawyer’s intent, this Note has attempted to show 
how the public’s interest in punishing harmful conduct according to 
its own standards of culpability can be vindicated consistently with 
the profession’s interest in discharging its traditional functions 
without fear of sanction. If such a standard takes root, academic 
critics, judges, bar disciplinary counsel, and prosecutors alike will 
have a better method to distinguish innocent advising activity from 
complicity in illegal or criminal conduct. Without a normative 
standard in place, questions about the scope of lawyers’ complicity 
that arose in the torture-memo, Enron, and Kaye Scholer 
 
 192. See supra Part I. 
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controversies will remain unanswered, ready to surface again in some 
future crisis. 
